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FUTURE SEX
BENNETT CAPERS*
INTRODUCTION
Reports of the death of utopia have been greatly exaggerated.
—Caitrı́ona Nı́ Dhúill, Sex in Imagined Spaces 1
“After decades of intense scrutiny and repeated attempts at ambitious reforms, our laws against rape and sexual harassment still
fail to protect women from sexual overreaching and abuse. What
went wrong?”2 Thus opens Stephen Schulhofer’s seminal book,
written just over two decades ago, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law. Schulhofer was far from alone in his
assessment.3 Moreover, it is safe to say that, despite continued reform efforts, results still remain underwhelming, at least in terms of
protecting women from sexual assault. Now, more than two decades
later, Schulhofer’s question still echoes. What went wrong?
This brief essay does not attempt to chronicle everything that
went wrong with the reform movement, though elsewhere I have
suggested a few missed opportunities.4 Rather, in this essay I raise
questions of my own, questions that seem as necessary, and as urgent, as Schulhofer’s “What went wrong?” My own first question is
this: If we truly want to craft reforms that “protect women”—and
allow me to add men5—”from sexual overreaching and abuse,” in
* Copyright  2020 by I. Bennett Capers. Stanley A. August Professor of Law,
Brooklyn Law School. B.A. Princeton University; J.D. Columbia Law School.
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York 1995–2004. E-mail:
Bennett.capers@brooklaw.edu.
1. CAITRÍONA NÍ DHÚILL, SEX IN IMAGINED SPACES: GENDER AND UTOPIA FROM
MORE TO BLOCH 1 (2010).
2. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION
AND THE FAILURE OF LAW ix (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 2000).
3. See, e.g., CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT (1992); Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1998) (observing that despite decades of reforms “designed to free
rape law from . . . misogynistic antecedents, contemporary courts remain hostage
to the traditional definitions, which require rape victims to surmount special legal
obstacles that the victims of other crimes are spared.”).
4. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
1345 (2010); I. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2011); I.
Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826 (2013).
5. As I have written previously, male victim rape has too long been confined
to the margins and footnotes. Put simply, “male-victim rape is real rape, too.” Capers, Real Rape Too, supra note 4, at 1264.
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short, from unwanted sex, then doesn’t it behoove us to begin by
having an open, honest discussion about wanted sex? Second, and
perhaps more importantly: In crafting real reforms that make a real
difference, might there be advantages to imagining what a future
with only wanted sex would look like? This essay contends that the
answer to both questions is yes.
Allow me to say up front that I view this intervention as a
friendly amendment to the project Schulhofer laid out in Unwanted
Sex, a project which continues, albeit this time as a group effort, as
he spearheads efforts of the American Law Institute to revise the
sexual assault provisions of the Model Penal Code. Schulhofer himself describes the ALI project as the “messy and frustrating work of
legislative compromise, trying to design law reform that can be
both progressive and enactable.”6 Schulhofer makes no bones
about the fact that his goal is to pass reforms that move “our criminal justice system in a progressive direction, to the place where society ought to be.”7 My intervention is to suggest that we think about
wanted sex first. And that we envision what our ideal would be. Put
differently, that we imagine a future perfect, so to speak.8 After all,
it is this future that should be our north star, that will help us keep
our eyes on the prize and reduce the likelihood of our being sidetracked or losing track and ending up someplace else. It will reduce
too the likelihood of us passing reforms that inadvertently contribute to mass incarceration, over-criminalization, and the racialized
and gendered policing that seem to accompany them.
My argument proceeds in two parts. Part One begins with a
thumbnail sketch of where we are now with respect to rape law,
including the reform efforts of the ALI, and the sea change that the
#MeToo movement does, and does not, herald. It then turns to how
we have sex now, and suggests that wanted sex must inform how we
think about, and craft reforms to deter, unwanted sex. Part Two
begins an argument for imagining the future, and then borrows
from visions of science fiction writers and other futurists to imagine
a world free from unwanted sex. Put differently, it explores how
feminist futurists have imagined sexual autonomy in a utopian
6. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335, 335
(2017).
7. Id.
8. This essay thus falls into the category of legal futurist scholarship, which
imagines the distant future, and the law’s role in that future. For an early bibliography of legal futurist writing, see David A. Funk, Legal Futurology: The Field and Its
Literature, 73 L. LIBR. J. 625 (1980). For a recent example, see I. Bennett Capers,
Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2019).
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world. And it argues that imagining an ideal future is the first step
in mapping a path there.
I.
(UN)WANTED SEX
Science fiction isn’t just thinking about the world out there.
It’s also thinking about how that world might be—a particularly important exercise for those who are oppressed, because
if they’re going to change the world we live in, they—and all of
us—have to be able to think about a world that works
differently.
—Samuel Delany9
Before turning to what a society with only wanted sex might
look like, it makes sense to first begin by taking stock of where we
have been, and where we are now. If nothing else, this starting
point will give us a sense of how much ground there is to cover.
This part accordingly sketches out the black letter law of rape that
predominated up until the 1970s, the reforms that followed feminist agitation for change, and ongoing efforts to reform rape law.
But this is only the first goal of this part. The second goal is to add
an honest discussion of wanted sex, or how we have sex now, to the
conversation about the law of unwanted sex.
A. Past Imperfect
As any student of rape law knows, the black letter law of rape
has always been deceptively simple. At English common law, rape
was defined as “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against
her will,”10 and American jurisdictions for the most part adopted
this definition.11 The elements of the offense were also deceptively
simple: to be guilty of rape, the prosecution had to establish that
there had been vaginal intercourse, that the intercourse was obtained by force, and that the intercourse occurred despite
nonconsent.12
9. Samuel R. Delany, The Art of Fiction No. 210, 197 PARIS REV. 27 (2011).
10. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210
(Chicago Press ed. 1979) (1765–1769).
11. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 L. & PHIL. 35, 36–37 (1992).
12. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 318 (7th ed. 2001).
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As any student of the history of rape law also knows, the definition of rape favored men, not women.13 For example, courts interpreted the force element as requiring not only that the defendant
used force to obtain sex, but that the complainant resisted with
force of her own. In fact, her own use of responsive force was essential to establish two elements: that the “defendant’s force was really
force and to prove that the victim’s nonconsent, no matter how
many times expressed verbally, was really nonconsent.”14 Nor would
just any quantum of force do. At common law, women were required to resist to the utmost before a defendant could be found
guilty. As one court put it, “[N]ot only must there be entire absence
of mental consent or assent, but there must be the most vehement
exercise of every physical means or faculty within the woman’s
power to resist the penetration of her person, that this must be
shown to persist until the offense is consummated.”15 Absent such
defensive force, a claim of rape would not stand. As Anne Coughlin
wryly put it, early rape law permitted men something akin to a “woman’s failure of actus reus defense.”16
Evidentiary rules tipped the scales in favor of defendants as
well. Rape was one of the few crimes where a complainant’s word
was insufficient. Before a defendant could be found guilty, there
had to be some independent corroboration of the complainant’s
account, as well as evidence that the complainant complained
promptly.17 These evidentiary rules were considered so essential to
protect defendants that the Model Penal Code’s drafters, who at
the time were considered progressive thinkers,18 included them in
the sexual assault provisions of the Code.19 In addition, evidentiary
13. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1780–81 (1992)
(observing that rape laws have always had the effect of “reinforcing the interest of
males in controlling sexual access to females”); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 62–63
(1987) (arguing that rape law protected “male access to women where guns and
beatings are not needed to secure it”).
14. Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 4, at 834.
15. Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906).
16. Coughlin, supra note 3, at 36.
17. See generally Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 953–64 (2004); Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra
note 4, at 835; SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, & RACHEL E. BARKOW,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 436–37 (10th ed. 2001).
18. MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 6–22 (2002); see
also Luis E. Chiesa, The Model Penal Code and Mass Incarceration, 25 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 605 (2018).
19. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4), (5).

2021]

FUTURE SEX

297

rules allowed defendants to cross-examine complainants about
their sexual history, and in some cases even introduce extrinsic evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual history, to contest the lack of
consent and to undermine the complainant’s credibility.20 In effect,
evidentiary rules allowed the defendant to put the complainant on
trial “to determine whether she was the type of woman who consents, the type of woman to lie about it, and hence the type of woman who should not be protected by the law, at least not at the
expense of the presumptively good man.”21 As I have written
before, “All of this served to frame rape trials as pitting bad women
against good men. All of this served to tip the scales in a way that
benefited these men to the detriment of women.”22
There is one other point to be made, however. The common
narrative that rape law advantaged men and disadvantaged women
becomes more complicated, and even false, when race is added to
the analysis. Before the Reconstruction Amendments, black letter
law often dictated harsher punishments for black men convicted of
raping white women—the whiteness of the victim essentially triggered a sentencing enhancement, even capital punishment.23 But
even after explicit distinctions were invalidated or fell into desuetude, a type of unwritten law remained.24 This unwritten law, which
I have elsewhere described as a type of “white letter law”25—think
of white ink on white paper, invisible to the naked eye, but there
nonetheless—continued to disfavor black men accused of sexually
assaulting white women.26
The common narrative was also different for black female victims. During the long period of slavery, enslaved black women were
denied any sexual autonomy, with the law granting owners license
and sexual access to enslaved blacks, both for sexual gratification
and for forced breeding with other slaves.27 Though less common,
20. Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 4, at 835.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 839.
23. Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, supra note 4, at 1355–56.
24. Id. at 1357.
25. I first introduced the concept “white letter law” in an earlier article. See I.
Bennett Capers, The Trial of Bigger Thomas: Race, Gender, and Trespass, 31 N.Y.U.
REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 7–8 (2006). Unlike black letter law, which brings to
mind statutory law, written law, the easily discernible law set forth as black letters
on a white page, “white letter law” suggests societal and normative laws that stand
side by side and often undergird black letter law but, as if inscribed in white ink on
white paper, remain invisible to the naked eye.
26. Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, supra note 4, at 1364–71.
27. Sharon Block, Lines of Color, Sex, and Service: Comparative Sexual Coercion in
Early America, in SEX, LOVE, RACE: CROSSING BOUNDARIES IN NORTH AMERICAN HIS-
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it is also worth noting that black women were subjected to medical
experimentation, often without anesthesia, in the name of science—to these nonconsenting women, we owe the science of gynecology.28 To justify this denial of sexual autonomy, black women
were cast as naturally libidinous, and indeed as “unrapeable.”29
Gary LaFree’s study of juror attitudes suggests that present-day jurors remain less likely to view the rape of black women as real
rape.30
B. Agitation for Reform
With the Women’s Rights movement came agitation for reform. The result was nothing less than game-changing, at least in
terms of reforms on the books. Indeed, it can be argued that no
other area of criminal law witnessed as much change.31 Within the
space of years, jurisdictions abandoned or limited the resistance requirement and concomitantly reduced the force requirement, and
added degrees to the offense rape—giving prosecutors and jurors
more options.32 They recognized that marriage was not the same as
consent in perpetuity, and abolished marital immunity rules.33
Rape statutes were revised with gender-neutral language.34 Jurisdictions retreated from corroboration and prompt reporting requirements.35 Perhaps most importantly, there was a widespread
141, 141 (Martha Hodes ed., 1999); see also Capers, Real Women, Real Rape,
supra note 4, at 865.
28. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION,
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 175–76 (1997); HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL
APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 61–68 (2008).
29. Darci E. Burrell, Recent Developments, Myth, Stereotype, and the Rape of Black
Women, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 87, 89 (1993); Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra
note 4, at 865–71; see also Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 118–22 (1983).
30. Gary D. LaFree et al., Jurors’ Responses to Victims’ Behavior and Legal Issues in
Sexual Assault Trials, 32 SOC. PROBS. 389, 397–402 (1985); see also Jeffrey J. Pokorak,
Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-ofVictim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 37–43 (2006) (reviewing studies).
31. Cf. Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad,
40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651, 651 (2008) (“Seldom has an aspect of the criminal law
changed as dramatically as has the law governing sexual offenders.”).
32. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 627-28 (4th ed.
2006).
33. Id. at 641.
34. Id. at 618.
35. Id. at 642–43.
TORY
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adoption of rape shield rules, protecting complainants from crossexamination and evidence about their sexual histories at trial.36
These changes happened relatively quickly, but this is not to
suggest that rape law has been stagnant since the 1970s. Far from it,
though changes have been piecemeal and have not had the same
widespread impact as in earlier years. There have been efforts to
move from requiring evidence of consent (yes) rather than evidence of non-consent (no).37 And for the last several years, Professors Schulhofer and Erin Murphy have been spearheading an effort
to revise the MPC.38 Of course, changes in the law of rape tell only
part of the story. What have been equally significant are the
changes in culture, again from “no means no” to “yes means yes.”
There is an awareness of sexual assault in the military and on campus like never before. Church scandals have brought the victimization of boys into the national conversation, though the sexual
assault of adult men remains in the margins, largely invisible.39
Cases like those involving Stanford swimmer Brock Turner40 or the
Steubenville teens41 have become lightning rods for discussion, as
did the #Slutwalk movement42 a few years earlier. The most significant cultural phenomenon, however, has been the #MeToo movement, and with it the realization that unwanted sex remains
prevalent. One of the interesting things about the #MeToo movement is how little impact it has had on rape law itself.43 Indeed,
36. For an overview of these changes and other changes, see SUSAN CARADDRESSING RAPE REFORM IN LAW AND PRACTICE (2009). See also SPOHN &
HORNEY, supra note 3.
37. See Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 340–41.
38. Id. at 335.
39. See Capers, Real Rape Too, supra note 4.
40. For a discussion of the Turner case, see Liam Stack, Light Sentence for Brock
Turner in Stanford Rape Case Draws Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/outrage-in-stanford-rape-case-over-duelingstatements-of-victim-and-attackers-father.html [https://perma.cc/2KJ5-UNTZ].
The Turner case has also been the focus of at least one law review article. See
Michael Vitiello, Brock Turner: Sorting Through the Noise, 49 MCGEORGE L. REV. 631
(2017).
41. For an overview of the Steubenville case, see Ariel Levy, Trial by Twitter,
NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/
05/trial-by-twitter [https://perma.cc/A9JD-SZV8].
42. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 1453, 1458-59 (2014).
43. Cf. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2019). See Anthony Michael Kries, Defensive Glass Ceilings, 88 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 147 (2020) (noting that much of #MeToo has been exogenous to the law,
though some legal reform has resulted). But see Linda S. Greene et al., Talking
about Black Lives Matter and #MeToo, 34 WISC. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 109, 163 (2020)
INGELLA,
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what #MeToo highlights is that rape law, or the law of unwanted
sex, is still inadequate.
C. The Way We Live (and Have Sex) Now
It is common in scholarship providing an overview of rape law
to stop here, and then proceed to offer a normative vision of how
rape law can be reformed. But to state this should reveal how inadequate it seems. Indeed, it may explain why we have failed so badly at
protecting individuals from sexual assault and other violations of
their sexual autonomy. Put bluntly, if we want to protect individuals
from unwanted sex, which involves line drawing, then it makes sense
to give some thought to wanted sex. And to give some attention to
the role the law has played in regulating both. Indeed, once we
begin to think about wanted sex, the connection between regulating both unwanted sex and wanted sex becomes hard not to see.
The law’s regulation of unwanted sex, however inadequate, has
never operated alone. At the same time the law prohibited the
Blackstonian version of rape—man/woman/force/sex/nonconsent— the law was also active in circumscribing and policing
wanted sex.44 Indeed, Anne Coughlin has persuasively argued that
“we cannot understand rape law unless we study [it], not in isolation, but in conjunction with the fornication and adultery prohibitions with which it formerly resided and, perhaps, continues to
reside.”45 Allow me to add the bans on same-sex sex and polygamy46
and even seduction47 to the list of laws that operated in conjunction
with rape laws. One could also add Comstock laws and the Motion
Picture Production Code, which aimed to protect traditional family
values by regulating the circulation of “obscene” material.48 In
(discussing proposed and adopted legislation addressing sexual harassment in
employment).
44. See generally REGULATING SEX: THE POLITICS OF INTIMACY AND IDENTITY
(Elizabeth Bernstein & Laurie Schaffner eds., 2005).
45. Coughlin, supra note 3, at 6.
46. Interestingly, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), the Court not
only upheld a criminal law prohibiting polygamous marriage, but went on to
equate polygamous marriages with “despotism” and monogamous marriages with
democracy. Id. at 165–66. For a discussion of the absurdity of this linkage, see Jill
Elaine Hasday, Invisible Women: How Erasing Women’s Struggles for Equality Perpetuates
Inequality, at 25 (on file with author).
47. See Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(using the history of statutes criminalizing seduction to argue that marriage has
been used and continues to be used as state-imposed discipline).
48. For a fascinating discussion of the origins of the Comstock Act and Hays
Code see GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION 153–78 (2017). It is telling, for example, that the Motion Picture Production Code was troubled by the use
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short, the law has always played an active and disciplining role in
suppressing sexual difference altogether, and channeling the one
type of sex the law approved of—heterosexual sex—to marriage, or
what Ariela Dubler calls the “marriage cure.”49
Here too, race mattered. State-approved sex was not only heterosexual sex in the privacy of the marital home, but was also required to be same-race sex.50 Indeed, this racial policing likely
explains why different-race couples were often the target of cohabitation prohibitions.51 In the case of same-race heterosexual
couples, there was at least the possibility that their sexual congress
might metastasize into marriage; there was no such possibility with
different-race couples, at least not until 1967 when the Court invalidated anti-miscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia.52 A similar
sexual policing also explains why same-sex sex was so heavily policed—consider the pastime of heterosexuals making out in cars
and lovers’ lanes,53 and the different policing brought to bear on
of the phrase “damned to you” in Gone With the Wind, but not the suggested rape
scene in the film. See STEVE WILSON, THE MAKING OF GONE WITH THE WIND 37
(2014). The Motion Picture Production Code also barred depictions of interracial
relationships and “sexual perversion,” i.e., homosexuality. See VITO RUSSO, THE
CELLULOID CLOSET: HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE MOVIES (1987). See generally Bob
Mondello, Remembering Hollywood’s Hays Code, 40 Years On, NPR (Aug. 8, 2008),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93301189 [https://per
ma.cc/ULZ6-W6SQ].
49. See Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex,
117 YALE L.J. 756, 764 (2006). See also Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman,
Sex in and out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809 (2010).
50. Indeed, it would be even more accurate to say race and gender mattered.
During the colonial period, laws were modified to turn a blind eye to consensual
and non-consensual sex between white men and black slave women, and to mark
any offspring as property. At the same time, laws and norms prohibited unions
between black men and white women. For example, in 1664, Maryland declared it
a “disgrace to the Nation” for “English women [to] intermarry with Negro slaves.”
Both Maryland and Virginia eventually made it an offense for white women to have
sexual relations with black men. Thomas Jefferson even lobbied for banishment of
any white woman who bore a black child. See IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE
BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA 40–41, 117
(2016).
51. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating a cohabitation law targeting different-race couples). A same-race couple living together
could pass as married and escape scrutiny. By contrast, because interracial marriage itself was barred, the fact that a different race couple was living together was
on its face proof of a crime: either they were violating marriage laws, or they were
violating cohabitation laws.
52. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
53. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered Space, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 730–33 (1995).
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gay men in parks54—and how a necessary corrective to such discriminatory policing was not just Lawrence v. Texas,55 but also
Obergefell v. Hodges.56 In short, it is not just unwanted sex that the
law regulates, but also wanted sex.57
Before engaging in line-drawing to distinguish illicit sex from
licit sex, it also makes sense to have an open discussion about how
we have sex now. As Deborah Tuerkheimer noted several years ago,
“[W]omen’s sexuality and our sense of its dimensions have continued to evolve.”58 We know that, of women between the ages of 18
and 49, most have engaged in oral sex in the past year, and that
almost half have engaged in anal sex.59 Mary Fan adds that we are
in a “casual sex culture,” where young adults “are abandoning traditional dating and increasingly engaging in casual sex with people
they do not know very well,” including “sex outside of relationships
or in concurrent relationships.”60 In fact, it is very likely that these
descriptions only begin to cover how we have sex now. For example,
a recent survey of over 200 individuals over the age of 18 revealed
that approximately 44% have engaged in sex in a public place, that
21% have been tied up or tied up someone else as part of sex, that
over 50% have engaged in mutual masturbation, and that approximately 32% have engaged in spanking as part of sex.61 Another
54. See, e.g., Jordan Blair Woods, Don’t Tap, Don’t Stare, and Keep Your Hands to
Yourself! Critiquing the Legality of Gay Sting Operations, 12 J. OF GENDER, RACE, AND
JUST. 545 (2009); J. Kelly Strader & Lindsey Hay, Lewd Stings: Extending Lawrence v.
Texas to Discriminatory Enforcement, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 465 (2019).
55. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating same-sex sodomy laws as violating the
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause).
56. 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015) (holding that the right to marry is a fundamental
liberty and that prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying violates due process).
57. As I have written previously, by marking which conduct it deems illicit, the
law “also indirectly marks other conduct as licit”:
For example, a law that criminalizes same-sex sex almost by definition gives its
imprimatur to heterosexual sex, contributing to what Adrienne Rich long ago
terms “compulsory heterosexuality.” A law that penalizes adultery not only
condemns sex outside of marriage, but concomitantly privileges sexual fidelity
within marriage . . . . In short, the criminal law has always played favorites.
I. Bennett Capers, Home is Where the Crime Is, 109 U. MICH. L. REV. 979, 988 (2011).
58. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461, 1464
(2012).
59. Id.
60. Mary Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 537–43 (2011).
61. Debby Herbenick, et al., Sexual Diversity in the United States: Results from a
Nationally Representative Probability Sample of Adult Women and Men, PLOS ONE (July
20, 2017), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0181198 [https://perma.cc/6YCQ-QN3V].
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study, focusing on men, showed that 15% had performed analingus, and that 24% had received anal fingering.62 Add to this the
prevalence of casual sex apps such as Grindr and Tinder, the latter
of which is used by approximately a quarter of all adults between
the ages of 25 and 34.63 Add evidence that online pornography featuring violence against women is more popular among women than
men,64 and that the most popular search term for women consumers of online porn, after “lesbian,” is “threesome.”65 What else? A
recent study suggests that fewer than half of teens (ages 13 to 20)
identify as “exclusively heterosexual.”66 There is evidence that many
adults find kissing more intimate than sex, even though sexual assault laws tend to regulate only the latter.67 And that a lot of women
worry about why their boyfriends don’t want sex more.68 Studies
also show that women under-report consensual sexual activities, especially activities that may be frowned upon such as having multiple
62. Michael Castleman, Heterosexual Anal Play: Increasingly Popular, PSYCHOLTODAY (Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/all-aboutsex/201 012/heterosexual-anal-play-increasingly-popular [https://perma.cc/
77NZ-3GU2].
63. See Percentage of U.S. internet users who use Tinder as of January 2018, by age
group, STATISTA (2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/814698/share-of-us-internet-users-who-use-tinder-by-age/ [https://perma.cc/N3EB-P4NL]. Although
Tinder is not solely for casual sex, nearly half of surveyed respondents state they
use Tinder specifically for “hooking up.” See Sammy Nickalls, More than 50% of
People Who Use Tinder Do It Out of Boredom, ESQUIRE (Sep. 7, 2017), https://
www.esquire.com/lifestyle/sex/a12149373/tinder-statistics-study/ [https://
perma.cc/6RUM-MKPN].
64. SETH STEPHENS-DAVIDOWITZ, EVERYBODY LIES: BIG DATA, NEW DATA, AND
WHAT THE INTERNET CAN TELL US ABOUT WHO WE REALLY ARE 121 (2017).
65. Michael Castleman, Surprising New Data from the World’s Most Popular Porn
Site, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday. com/us/
blog/all-about-sex/201803/surprising-new-data-the-world-s-most-popular-porn-site
[https://perma.cc/ZJ8S-JJ8C]. The next most popular search term for women
consumers, after “lesbian” and “threesome,” are “big dick,” “ebony,” and
“gangbang.” Id.
66. Zing Tsjeng, Teens These Days are Queer AF, New Study Says, VICE (Mar. 10,
2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kb4dvz/teens-these-days-are-queer-afnew-study-says [https://perma.cc/NM3B-TTS7].
67. Noam Shpancer, What’s in a Kiss?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Nov. 3, 2013),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/insight-therapy/201311/what-s-inkiss. [https://perma.cc/PG3V-ST9J]. Proposed revisions to the MPC’s sexual assault provisions criminalize nonconsensual touching of certain intimate body
parts, but do not criminalize nonconsensual kissing. Thus, knowingly touching
someone’s inner thigh without consent is criminal under the revisions. “Stealing” a
kiss is not. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.0(6)(c), 213.7 (AM. L. INST., Proposed
Official Draft 2017).
68. STEPHENS-DAVIDOWITZ, supra note 64, at 122.
OGY
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sexual partners.69 By contrast, because having multiple sexual partners is often viewed as a badge of honor among men, men tend to
over-report the number of their sexual partners.70 What else? People are increasingly ceding control with technology, allowing others
to remotely operate sex toys, sometimes referred to as
teledildonics.71
All of this is a far cry from the notions of sex during the time of
Blackstone when we defined rape as forced vaginal penetration by a
male despite nonconsent. It is also a far cry from how we had, and
thought about, sex just a few decades ago. Consider that long after
the MPC was drafted, female sexuality in particular was still thought
of as
romantic, non-genital, passive/responsive, monogamous, and
not open to autonomous expression. In this stereotype, the
normal woman is so chaste that her arousal can scarcely be
termed sexual, but is instead a purely emotional response: “romantic longing.” . . . Female sexual desire [becomes] not so
much an end in itself as . . . a means for fulfilling other needs
and desires: love and motherhood.72
We’ve come a long way, baby.73 And it is the fact that we have
traveled so far that should prompt a series of questions. If, for example, we believe the best way to protect sexual autonomy is to insist, through laws and norms, that consent be obtained before sex,
then what do we mean by sex? If consent is to be based on the
totality of the circumstances, what might that mean given the myr69. Shervin Assari, Why Men and Women Lie About Sex, and How This Complicates
STD Control, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.thebodypro. com/
article/why-men-and-women-lie-about-sex-and-how-this-compl [https://perma.cc/
36SF-V6TN].
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., The Future is NOW: 13 Remote-Controlled Sex Toys Available Today,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-future-isnow-13remo_b_9645460?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=AHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29
vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAMzGXfPkTnjDUWKDQC4J3eF8-inLTenvOobxWs2i3EmszDHsFui_msZFGct2Kdsmu_7vtbQJeI0SbQYQ7rX
8L1lKWlV_Lyr9Mdxrck8-x-EcPv5OmcYgvbG9JJI0hm8dHPJKleL08wPF9wQ9qggAt3dnFBF1-YU3ftA_Pu1AgmY [https://perma.cc/X5Q2-LQ6P].
72. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 207 (2001) (quoting REBECCA MARIE YOUNG, SEXING THE
BRAIN: MEASUREMENT AND MEANING IN BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON HUMAN SEXUALITY
251, 299 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation)).
73. “You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby” was both an advertising slogan and a
frequent refrain of the early feminist movement. See Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a
Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy, in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1871, 1872 (2006) (discussing phrase).
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iad ways in which we communicate and have sex now? And if we’re
serious about reforms to reduce unwanted sex, should we not invite
to the table individuals who write and think about wanted sex? As a
case in point, the invited participants in the American Law Institute’s project to re-write the Model Penal Code’s sexual assault provisions include professors and judges, prosecutors and defense
lawyers, and victim rights advocates. It does not include Dan Savage
or any sex worker or sex expert.74 Indeed, it hardly includes anyone
under 40. And there are other questions still. What might rape law
look like if we abandon our antiquated notions about how people
have sex, and really think about how people have sex now? Indeed,
what might rape law look like if we could let go of the historical
baggage that rape law brings with it, if we could shake off the centuries of patriarchy and norms, and start anew? If we stopped seeing
sex “as something that is done to, not by, women?”75 And if we recognized sex as something that is done to, not just by, men? With a
tabula rasa, starting afresh, what might rape law look like now? And
to quote the queer and feminist theorist Katherine Franke, “Can
the law protect pleasure?”76 Is it possible that by answering these
questions, we might realize that the “overwhelming attention we
have devoted to prohibitions against bad or dangerous sex has obscured, if not eliminated, a category of desires and pleasures in
which women”—and men—”might actually want to indulge”?77
II.
FUTURE SEX
The point of creating futures is to get people to imagine what
they want and don’t want to happen down the road, and
maybe do something about it.
—Marge Piercy78
Thus far I have focused attention on the failure of our efforts
to reduce unwanted sex, which I attribute in part to our failure to
talk openly and honestly about wanted sex. This final part goes a
step further to ask what a future world where there is little or no
unwanted sex would actually look like, and if there are necessary
preconditions to such a world. Specifically, this part turns to how
74. Participants, Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, AMERICAN
L. INST. https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-related-offe nses/
#participants [https://perma.cc/7U62-L69H].
75. Franke, supra note 72, at 199.
76. Id. at 183.
77. Id. at 200.
78. MARGE PIERCY, WOMAN ON THE EDGE OF TIME vii (2016).
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feminist futurists have imagined a world where sexual autonomy is
the norm. And it asks, “What happens to gender arrangements, to
sexual identities and sexual and reproductive practices, when they
are imagined anew within the fictional space of a utopian order?”79
The point of exploring how feminist futurists have imagined
utopia free from unwanted sex is not necessarily so that we can
mark a particular feminist vision as our end point, but to use these
visions “as a necessary stimulus to socio-political transformation.”80
Put differently, the point is to prompt us to consider what an ideal
future without unwanted sex might look like. Literary theorist Caitrı́ona Nı́ Dhúill’s observation is useful here:
“[B]y portraying differently constructed social orders, [these
alternative futures] draw attention to the constructedness of
social orders generally, thus suggesting that existing structures
are not inevitable.”81 The point, in other words, is to consider
what social structures we expect will be part of, and even necessary to, a world without unwanted sex. The hope is that this
exercise can “get people to imagine what they want and don’t
want down the road, and maybe do something about it.”82
To be clear, most early imaginings of sexual futures would today strike us as decidedly retrograde. There is the 1938 short story,
“Helen O’Loy,” about a scientist who designs the perfect wife by
creating a robot.83 There is Robert Heinlein’s novel Podkayne of
Mars, featuring a female protagonist who, however adventurous in
the opening pages, by the end embraces traditional notions of gender and sex, proclaiming, “We were designed for having babies. A
baby is a lot more fun than differential equations.”84 Far more typical, however, was a failure to imagine women in anything that went
beyond a secondary or even tertiary role. In the much-heralded film
2001: A Space Odyssey, women are almost entirely absent, except as
79. Id. at 2.
80. Michael J. Griffin & Tom Moylan, Introduction to EXPLORING THE UTOPIAN
IMPULSE: ESSAYS ON UTOPIAN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 11 (Michael J. Griffin & Tom
Moylan eds.) (2007).
81. DHÚILL, supra note 1, at 8.
82. PIERCY, supra note 78.
83. See Lester Del Rey, Helen of Troy, in SCIENCE FICTION HALL OF FAME 73
(Robert Silverberg ed., 1971). As one SF scholar observed, the robot-wife “learns
about romance from TV soap operas, cooks, cleans, and sobs her heart out when
her ‘husband-inventor’ arrives home late from work. Beverly Friend, Virgin Territory: Women and Sex in Science Fiction, 14 EXTRAPOLATION 49, 49 (1972).
84. ROBERT HEINLEIN, PODKAYNE OF MARS 56 (1963).
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mini-skirt-wearing stewardesses and an assistant to a male scientist.85
In the original Star Trek series, the only prominent female cast
member is Lt. Uhura, a “communications officer,” whose job recalls
a switchboard operator.86 The remaining women, usually new ones
each episode, largely appear as sexual conquests of the main character Captain Kirk, a “footloose, carefree adventurer, the James
Bond of interstellar travel.”87
Other futurist works explore future sex, but are decidedly dystopian. I am thinking here of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World,88
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four,89 Margaret Atwood’s companion novels The Handmaid’s Tale 90 and The Testament,91 and Naomi
Alderman’s recent bestseller, The Power.92 Or if not completely dystopian, at least dystopian-ish. An example of the latter is Sally
Gearheart’s The Wanderground, which concludes that “women and
men cannot yet, and may not ever, love one another without violence; they are no longer of the same species.”93
What motivates my inquiry, however, is not dystopia but its opposite, utopia. More importantly, I want to consider utopian visions
85. See Barry Keith Grant, Of Men and Monoliths: Science Fiction, Gender, and
2001: A Space Odyssey, in STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY, NEW ESSAYS 65
(Robert Kolker ed., 2006).
86. Marc Bernandin, ‘Star Trek Beyond’ Stars on ‘Uncomfortable Conversations,
Sulu’s Sexual Orientation, and the Future, L.A. TIMES (July 21, 2016), https://
www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/la-et-mn-star-trek-beyond-roundtable20160705-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/T4F6-Z6B6] (observing that “[f]or
all of ‘Star Trek’s groundbreaking inclusion in 1966, Uhura was kind of a switchboard operator.”). See also TO BOLDLY GO: ESSAYS ON GENDER AND IDENTITY IN THE
STAR TREK UNIVERSE (Nadine Farghaly & Simon Bacon eds., 2017).
87. Anne Cranny-Francis, Sexuality and Sex-Role Stereotyping in Star Trek, 12 SCI.
FICTION STUD. 274, 274 (1985).
88. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). Whether the novel is dystopian is debated. It depicts a world where citizens’ needs are all met, and where
there is unlimited sexual gratification. The government distributes the drug soma
to keep citizens happy. However, the novel’s protagonist craves to know suffering,
which he views as essential to being human.
89. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Berkley ed., Penguin Group
2003) (1948). In the novel, sex for pleasure is a crime. The Party aspires to a world
in which procreation “will be an annual formality, like the renewal of a ration card.
We shall abolish the orgasm.” Id. at 276.
90. See MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1985). As the character
Aunt Lydia explains to the women who have been kidnapped and forced into becoming child bearers in exchange for protection, the past was about “freedom to.
Now you are being given freedom from. Don’t underrate it.” Id. at 33.
91. See MARGARET ATWOOD, THE TESTAMENT (2019).
92. See NAOMI ALDERMAN, THE POWER (2016).
93. SALLY MILLER GEARHEART, WANDERGROUND 115 (1979).

308

NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

[Vol. 76:293

as not just light entertainment, but as a critical practice.94 After all,
as literary theorist Frances Bartkowski observes, the utopian voice
“is always tendentious; it has designs on the reader.”95 (It is not insignificant that the work that coined the term utopia—Thomas
More’s Utopia, written in 1516—discusses, among other things, sexual relations and the harshness of the penal code.)96 In particular, I
am interested in the handful of decidedly feminist utopias—part of
what Marleen Barr calls “feminist fabulations”97—that we find in
science fiction. Even in narrowing the focus to feminist utopias,
though, some further culling is necessary. For starters, I am putting
to the side the feminist utopias that exclude men altogether.98
Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s Herland and Joanna Russ’s The Female
Man fall in this category.99 I put them aside because, as literary
scholar Marleen Barr observes, these women-only utopias “fail to
answer a question important to women who are not separatists: how
do men and women live together with dignity and equality.”100 I am
also putting to the side utopias that depend on genetic modifications, such as Ursula LeGuin’s The Left Hand of Darkness, in which
individuals have both sets of sexual organs and typically “have no
predisposition to either sexual role.”101 Although the end result
may seem inviting—there is “no unconsenting sex, no
rape . . . coitus can be performed only by mutual invitation and

94. DHÚILL, supra note 1, at 7 (embracing utopian fiction as a “critical
practice”).
95. FRANCES BARTKOWSKI, FEMINIST UTOPIAS 9 (1989).
96. See THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (1516).
97. MARLEEN BARR, LOST IN SPACE: PROBING FEMINIST SCIENCE FICTION AND BEYOND 13 (1993) (defining “feminist fabulation as an umbrella term that includes
science fiction, fantasy, utopian literature, and mainstream literature (written by
both women and men) that critiques patriarchal fictions”).
98. It is possible that these feminist writers viewed a utopia with men as a nonstarter, an impossibility, an oxymoron. As the futurist Joanna Russ writes, “[i]f men
are kept out of these [feminist utopias] it is because men are dangerous. They also
hog the good things in this world.” JOAN RUSS, TO WRITE LIKE A WOMAN: ESSAYS IN
FEMINISM AND SCIENCE FICTION 77 (1995). To my knowledge, there is no male
counterpart: outside of gay fiction, male writers do not imagine all male utopias.
99. See CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, HERLAND (1915); JOANNA RUSS, THE FEMALE MAN (1975).
100. BARR, supra note 97, at 69–70.
101. URSULA LE GUIN, THE LEFT HAND OF DARKNESS 90 (1969). Note too that
there is “no division of humanity into strong and weak halves, protective/protected, dominant/submissive, owner/chattel, active/passive.” Id. at 93.
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consent; otherwise it is not possible”102—the means of getting there
do not.103
That leaves non-separatist, and dare I say plausible, feminist
utopias, such as Ursula LeGuin’s The Dispossessed,104 Samuel Delaney’s Trouble on Triton,105 Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of
Time,106 and Octavia Butler’s utopia-in-waiting in Parable of the
Sower 107 and Parable of the Talents.108 What is notable is that so many
of these feminist utopias “not only ask the same questions and point
to the same abuses; they provide similar answers and remedies.”109
It is telling, for example, that in these feminist utopias, not only is
there no unwanted sex, but there is also complete gender equality.
It is perhaps also telling that these utopias depict communal, classless societies where government plays no role, or a very limited
one.110 Perhaps most importantly, these feminist utopias are all sexually permissive and today would be described as “sex positive.”111
In Woman on the Edge of Time, for example, since almost everyone
exists on a sexual continuum, bisexuality is the norm, so much so
that it is barely perceived as a category at all. It just is. Indeed, even
gendered pronouns have been retired; an individual is simply a
“per.”112 Similarly, in The Dispossessed, all forms of sexual activity are
treated as respectable, whether they are monogamous or casual or
heterosexual or not. In addition, in perhaps the most feminist of
these utopias—Woman on the Edge of Time—pregnancy has been
decoupled from biological sex, and gender has been decoupled
from child-rearing; in a sense, these visions engage with and concre102. Id. at 93.
103. Id. I am also putting to the side Delany’s Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of
Sand. In his novel, gender is contingent; the pronouns “he” and “she” are not
about sex organs, but rather are assigned depending on whether one desires or is
desired. See SAMUEL R. DELANY, STARS IN MY POCKET LIKE GRAINS OF SAND (20th ed.
2014).
104. See URSULA K. LEGUIN, THE DISPOSSESSED (1974).
105. See SAMUEL DELANY, TROUBLE ON TRITON: AN AMBIGUOUS HETEROTOPIA
(1976).
106. PIERCY, supra note 78.
107. See OCTAVIA E. BUTLER, PARABLE OF THE SOWER (1993).
108. See OCTAVIA E. BUTLER, PARABLE OF THE TALENTS (1998). Butler’s companion novels are set in a dystopian future, but their protagonist envisions a utopian end goal centered around a belief system described as Earthseed.
109. RUSS, TO WRITE LIKE A WOMAN, supra note 98, at 136.
110. Russ makes a similar observation. See id. at 136–39.
111. For an overview of sex-positive feminism, see Margot Kaplan, Sex-Positive
Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 94–98 (2014); Ummni Khan, Let’s Get It On: Some Reflections on Sex-Positive Feminism, 38 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 346 (2017).
112. PIERCY, supra note 78, at 57.
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tize the theoretical writings of Shulamith Firestone in The Dialectic of
Sex 113 and Dorothy Dinnerstein in The Mermaid and the Minotaur.114
Since Part One of this essay emphasized how race has shaped the
application of the law of unwanted sex, it pays to mention how
these utopias treat race. In these feminist utopias, race exists, but
has ceased to divide people or matter. As a member of the utopian
society in Woman on the Edge of Time explains,
[W]e decided to hold on to separate cultural identities . . . . We
want there to be no chance of racism again. But we don’t want
the melting pot where everybody ends up a thin gruel. We want
diversity, for its strangeness breeds richness.115
A similar sentiment pervades Butler’s novels. Indeed, one of
the tenets of the feminist vision in Parable of the Sower is “Embrace
diversity. Or be destroyed.”116
Again, the point of looking to feminist visions of utopias is to
use them “as a necessary stimulus to socio-political transformation”117 and motivate us to consider what an ideal future without
unwanted sex might look like. The point too is for us to raise questions about that future, questions that range from the seemingly
mundane to the seemingly consequential.
For example, in our future world free from unwanted sex and
unwanted sexual advances, are men still the primary initiators of
sex, or has sexual pursuit been de-gendered? Do men grow their
hair long, or only women? Are there still segregated restrooms, or
what critical theorist Jacques Lacan aptly called “urinary segregation,”118 and the expressive normative message of sexual difference
inherent in such a division? Are there still things straight couples
do in public without a care in the world, things that can trigger
113. See SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST
REVOLUTION (1970).
114. See DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE (1976).
115. PIERCY, supra note 78, at 96–97. Indeed, one of the most feminist things
about Piercy’s novel is that it features as its protagonist a poor woman of color,
Connie Ramos, who has experienced domestic violence, child abuse, and racism.
116. BUTLER, supra note 107, at 181. Or as one scholar put it, “Difference,
disagreement, and diversity provide the life force of [Butler’s] utopias.” See
Michelle Erica Green, “There Goes the Neighborhood”: Octavia Butler’s Demand for Diversity in Utopias, in UTOPIAN AND SCIENCE FICTION BY WOMEN: WORLDS OF DIFFERENCE
166, 168 (Jane L. Donawerth & Carol A. Kolmerten eds., 1994).
117. Griffin & Moylan, supra note 80.
118. Jacques Lacan, The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, in ECRITS: A SELECTION 161, 167 (Alan Sheridan trans., Norton 1977).
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violence when done by other couples, like holding hands?119 Do
people hug each other when they greet, or has this fallen out of
fashion in response to concerns about unwanted touching? Do people, wanting and needing physical contact,120 instead cuddle pets
and robots?121 Speaking of robots, how common are sex robots, embedded with “haptic interfaces” in their external membrane for
maximum realism?122 Is the commodification of sex still illegal, or
is exchanging sex for money viewed on par with being a social
worker, or a personal trainer? Has using apps to signal interest in
sex become the norm?123 Do the Alexas and Siris of the future function as panopticons, ever present police, to deter sex without consent? Or will Alexa and Siri seem curious relics, since we will have
all become cyborgs, as the cyberfeminist Donna Haraway
predicts?124 With our smartphones—now so common that “the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important
119. See Matt Stopera, 15 Things All Straight People Do That 2/3 of Gay People Are
Still Afraid To, BUZZFEED (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.buzzfeed.com/mjs 538/
straight-people-do-this-but-23-of-gay-people-are [https://perma.cc/8WN9-HZN9]
(summarizing the violence lesbian and gay people experience simply from holding
hands in public).
120. Suzanne Degges-White, Skin Hunger: Why You Need to Feed Your Hunger for
Contact, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday .com/us/
blog/lifetime-connections/201501/skin-hunger-why-you-need-feed-your-hungercontact [https://perma.cc/76YT-KPJF].
121. Already animatronic pets are used to provide tactile comfort to residents
at nursing homes. See Brittany Britto, Animatronic Pets at Retirement Homes a Sign of
How Robots Will Contribute to Our Lives, BALT. SUN (Mar. 30, 2017), https://
www.baltimoresun.com/features/pets/bs-lt-companion-cat-20170402-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6VX8-VEBP].
122. For more on the future of sex robots, see Jenny Kleeman, The Race to
Build the World’s First Sex Robots, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2017), https://
www.theguardian. com/technology/2017/apr/27/race-to-build-world-first-sexrobot [https://perma.cc/RF34-MGJD]. See also DAVID LEVY, LOVE + SEX WITH ROBOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN-ROBOT RELATIONSHIPS (2007).
123. Such apps are already being promoted on college campuses. See Meg
Graham, New Apps Urge Mutual Consent, ‘Yes Means Yes,’ When It Comes To Sex, CHI.
TRIB. (July 02, 2015), https://www. chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-weconsent-app-michael-lissack-bsi-20150720-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q9EBHW3T]; Maya Salam, Consent in the Digital Age: Can Apps Solve a Very Human Problem,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/technology/
consent-apps.html [https://perma.cc/A85U-VHSU].
124. Or rather, Donna Haraway argues that we are already cyborg, given our
symbiotic relationship with technology such as cars and smartphones. For Haraway, embracing our cyborg selves is also a way of undoing gender hierarchies.
See DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF
NATURE 149–50 (1991). In this sense, it might be more accurate to ask whether, in
the future, we will have embraced our cyborg nature.
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feature of human anatomy”125—is the concept of consent a relic of
the past, looked upon as a curious formality in a world in which
“desire can’t help but make itself known? It speaks, it demands, it
begs.”126 Has the line “between object and subject become[ ] hopelessly blurred”?127 “I want you because you want me because I want
you because you want me”?128 Are there sex clubs? Do people speak
honestly? Or is sex still viewed with something akin to shame, spoken of with circumlocution and evasion? Do only men go topless, or
women too?129 Have we unsexed pregnancy?130 Have we unsexed
mothering?131 Do we continue to give toys of aggression to boys and
toys of future maternity to girls? Do women still ride on the back of
motorcycles?132 Are men and women equal? Will we still think “women and children first”?133 Are queer and straight people equal?
Do we still racialize sex and sexualize race? Do condoms require
four hands to open?134 Does the Supreme Court still police women’s bodies? Is there still mass incarceration, and do we still
125. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 387 (2014).
126. Maya Dusenbery, Dispatch from the Post-Rape Future: Against Consent, Reciprocity, and Pleasure, in THE FEMINIST UTOPIA PROJECT: FIFTY-SEVEN VISIONS OF A
WILDLY BETTER FUTURE 17, 19 (Alexandra Brodsky & Rachel Kauder Nalebuff eds.,
2015).
127. Id. at 24.
128. Id.
129. See Nassim Alisobhani, Female Toplessness: Gender Equality’s Next Frontier, 8
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 299 (2018).
130. See David Fontana & Naomi Schoenbaum, Unsexing Pregnancy, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 309 (2019) (arguing that much of the carework of pregnancy can
be disaggregated from gender).
131. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 57, 60 (2012). Rosenblum argues that “mothering” and “fathering” have been inappropriately tethered to biosex. He goes on to argue:
“ ‘Mothering’ should be unsexed as the primary parental relationship. ‘Fathering,’
correspondingly, should be unsexed from its breadwinner status. In an ideal world,
people now considered ‘mothers’ and ‘fathers’ would be ‘parents’ first, a category
that includes all forms of caretaking.” Id. at 60.
132. Jessica Glenza, Women Shift Gears in Motorcycle Culture: “It’s About Being on
the Front of the Bike,” THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2015), https://
www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/aug/16/women-motorcycle-culture-litas-utah
[https://perma.cc/6UG3-N3ES] (noting the association of women as passengers
on bikes, “the subjugated companions of outlaw biker men,” and how the rear seat
is even referred to as the “bitch seat”).
133. The term “women and children first” originated as a norm for evacuation procedures in case of an emergency. For a critique of the concept as predicated on gender stereotypes and chivalry, and as inconsistent with gender equality,
see generally WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST: FEMINISM, RHETORIC, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(Sharon M. Meagher & Patrice DiQuinzio eds., 2005).
134. This is a reference to a “consent condom” developed in Argentina which
requires four hands to open. See Marissa Dellatto, The ‘Consent Condom’ Takes Four
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shackle pregnant prisoners during birth?135 Have we abolished prisons?136 Do women and men say “no” when they’re thinking “no,”
and “yes” when they’re thinking “yes,” addressing at least one of the
problems raised by scholars such as Aya Gruber and Kimberly
Ferzan?137 Is there still erotic role-playing and kink, from puppy
masks138 to tree sex139 to old-fashioned BDSM? To borrow from futurist Joanna Russ, in this utopia, are women “erotic integers and
not fractions waiting for completion”?140 Do people speak honestly?
Has power been reconfigured? Is everyone equal?
All of these questions are interconnected, and relate to unwanted sex. While they do not directly respond to Schulhofer’s
question, the question that opened this essay, “What went wrong?”,
they certainly seem essential to answering the question that lies just
beneath his question, and the question that motivates so many of us
writing and thinking about rape law: “How do we make things go
right?” What is our utopia, our alter mundus? For us, does utopia—a
Greek pun that could mean two things—lean towards “no place”
(utopia) or “the good place” (eutopia)?141 All of these questions
seem essential if we are serious about mapping a way to a future
perfect that does not involve missteps and misdirection and the perpetuating or exacerbating of the current ills of the criminal justice
system.
Hands to Open, N.Y. POST (Apr. 4, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/04/04/thisconsent-condom-takes-four-hands-to-open/ [https://perma.cc/QDW5-F7UF].
135. See, e.g., Priscilla Ocean, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the
Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1239 (2012).
136. See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 9, 42 (2003); Amna A.
Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of the Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 430 (2018);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 284 (2007).
137. See, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape,
13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2016); Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 405 (2006).
138. Blake Montgomery, We Live in Packs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/style/pup-play.html [https://perma.cc/B22V56JF] (describing the rise in puppy play, a subgenre of gay BDSM which often
involves participants donning puppy masks).
139. See Neil McArthur, Ecosexuals Believe Having Sex with the Earth Could Save
It, VICE.COM (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wdbgyq/ecosexuals-believe-having-sex-with-the-earth-could-save-it [https://perma.cc/X79XMUUV] (quoting a member of the ecosexual movement as describing the movement as encompassing, on one end, people “who enjoy skinny dipping and naked
hiking,” and on the other hand, “people who roll around in the dirt having an
orgasm” and “people who fuck trees, or masturbate under a waterfall.”).
140. RUSS, TO WRITE LIKE A WOMAN, supra note 98, at 142.
141. DHÚILL, supra note 1, at 5.
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This is my hope: That when we reach our future perfect, we
will look back and wonder about our dysfunctions, our circumlocutions, and how they contributed to both misunderstandings and
bad intentions and misplaced reforms and, yes, unwanted sex. We
will understand how the use of force could be an aggravating factor,
but react with perplexity that it was once the sine qua non to prove
rape. Looking back, we will ponder why people had so much
trouble saying no; but really, we will ponder why people had so
much trouble asking: Want to? We will see how this contributed to
mistake of fact defenses—I thought she was into it—the fact that
people didn’t ask, didn’t answer, and didn’t speak honestly. We will
question our prudishness about naming victims,142 and how such
prudishness contributed to the notion of there being property
value in women, that being a rape victim marks one as damaged
goods.143 We will look back at the gendered assumptions in rape
law, and even the gendered assumptions of progressive reformers—
from the drafters of the MPC144 to Schulhofer145 to the many Advisors of the ALI’s current effort to revise the MPC’s sexual assault
provisions146—with surprise. We will be embarrassed not only by
the benefit of the doubt given to white men accused of sexual assault, but also the presumption of guilt imposed on black men,147
and how feminist reforms challenged the former while ignoring the
142. See Deborah W. Denno, Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims’ Names, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (1994).
143. I. Bennett Capers, Rape, Truth, and Hearsay, 40 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 183,
186 n.17 (2017).
144. Deborah W. Denno, Model Penal Code Second: Good or Bad Idea?: Why the
Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be Pulled And Replaced, 1 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 207, 210 (2003) (critiquing the MPC’s gender specific requirement for
rape).
145. The one shortcoming in Schulhofer’s Unwanted Sex is its reliance on the
trope of weak female victims and male perpetrators. His language, too, is often
gendered, as for example when he writes that a woman’s right to sexual autonomy
too often does “not exist—until she begins to scream or fight back physically.”
SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 10. I doubt Schulhofer would have chosen the word
“scream” in the case of a male victim. Even in his discussion of doctors, lawyers,
therapists, and other professionals who may exert their power to negotiate sex,
Schulhofer seems to have trouble imagining anything other than a male
professional.
146. For example, a preliminary draft of the proposed revisions to the MPC’s
Sexual Assault Provisions included, among intimate body parts, a woman’s breast
but not a man’s breast, a distinction that seems both gendered and hetero-normative. See A.L.I., MPC: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT
NO. 8 (Sep. 15, 2017).
147. Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, supra note 4, at 1371–74.
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latter.148 We will question the easy turn to governance feminism,149
carceral feminism,150 the turn to state violence, and wonder why,
comparatively, we paid so little attention to healing victims. We will
wonder, “Why prisons?”, and wonder what exactly we were expecting to accomplish other than more unwanted sex, both in prison
and when prisoners were released. We will certainly cringe at the
way we ignored male victim rape, other than to make jokes about
dropping the soap in prison.151 We will wonder why so many advocates against unwanted sex were silent when the specter of bestial
black and brown men—think Birth of a Nation, think Willie Horton,
think “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their
best . . . . They’re rapists”152—was co-opted to promote white
supremacy, to disenfranchise blacks, to win a Presidential election,
to shut down the government for the sake of a border wall.
We might even look back to this point in time, this liminal moment, and think not only of the issues raised here, and the #MeToo
movement, and the absence of women in President Trump’s administration to say nothing of his casual sexism, but also litigation
before the Court. In April 2019, the Court heard oral argument in
the case Iancu v. Brunetti.153 In dispute: whether the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office’s refusal to register the clothing brand FUCT,
pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, violated the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. What upstaged the legal
issue, however, was the Justices’ discomfort in saying the brand
name FUCT during oral argument.154 Even the Solicitor General
148. Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, supra note 4, at 859–71.
149. See Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal
Responses to Rape Prosecution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J. OF L. & GENDER 335, 340 (2006) (coining the
term to describe “the incremental but by now quite noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power”); see also JANET HALLEY,
SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 20–22 (Princeton
Univ. Press 2006).
150. For a discussion of the rise of carceral feminism, see Erin Collins, The
Criminalization of Title IX, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 365, 368–73 (2016).
151. See, e.g., Capers, Real Rape Too, supra note 4.
152. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connectingmexican-immigrants-and-crime/?noredirect=ON&utm_term=.Ea54929947b2
[https://perma.cc/56N8-UVSM].
153. 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019), aff’g In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
154. Adam Liptak, A Vulgar Term Goes Unmentioned as It Gets Its Day in Court,
N.Y. TIMES (April 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/us/politics/
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avoided saying the word, opting instead to call it “the equivalent of
the past participle form of the paradigmatic profane word in our
culture.”155
If nothing else, I suspect in our future perfect world, we’ll be
comfortable saying people fuck. Men fuck women. Women fuck women. Women fuck men. Men fuck men. In combinations of two’s
and three’s and a host of other permutations. They use tongues and
assholes and strap-ons and lips and breasts and hands and fists and
apps and remote devices. I suspect in this future world, like the
worlds imagined in feminist futures, we will be comfortable with all
of the above. And with that comfort, we will make laws accordingly.
Until we make laws unnecessary.

supreme-court-vulgarity-trademark.html?searchResultPosition=1
perma.cc/Q7UQ-PW5H].
155. Id.
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